Introduction
When tackling the increasing challenge of biological and chemical weapons (BCW) proliferation, all military counterproliferation activities must focus on attacking the adversary's will to acquire, develop, enhance, proliferate, or employ these horrid weapons.
The tactical solution of destroying BCW, facilities, or critical nodes along the proliferation highway is not enough and, in all likelihood, impossible to accomplish. If the adversary's will remains strong and it believes that a biological and/or chemical warfare capability will provide political or military leverage, it will assuredly find ways to rebuild it.
As with any major operation or campaign, the Geographic Combatant Commander (CINC) must correctly identify the enemy's center of gravity. Without this knowledge, one cannot focus his or her thoughts on how to achieve operational success. "If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which is expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. The total means at his disposal and the strength of his will." 2 Clearly, counterproliferation of WMD is an interagency calling as well as a military one.
Interagency efforts must continue to exert pressure on known or potential proliferators • through nonproliferation agreements, export controls, political persuasion, conventional arms sales, regional security agreements, economic aid, alliances, and nuclear deterrence options. This paper, however, will solely concentrate on military efforts necessary for defeating the enemy's will by negating the perceived attractiveness of possessing or employing BCW. This can be accomplished by ensuring that: our forces are trained and confident to fight and win our Nation's wars in a biologically or chemically contaminated environment; they and key facilities are protected against BCW effects; our intelligence assets can and will locate BCW and facilities; our forces and munitions can destroy them; and, as a last resort, our forces can limit the effects of BCW through a robust consequence management plan. The focused execution of these tasks will serve to undermine the adversary's desire to possess or employ BCW, with the caveat that there are no absolute assurances for deterring irrational actors.
Current BCW Threat
BCW have become the most accessible WMD to both industrialized and developing countries. Basic versions of these relatively low technology weapons can be produced in almost any country with moderately developed chemical or pharmaceutical industries.
Known adversaries currently possessing BCW programs are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, China, and Cuba. The breakup of the Former Soviet Union adds another dimension to the threat.
Although no longer considered an adversary to the United States, the Former Soviet Union did possess the largest BCW capability in the world. 5 Various national agencies are working diligently to prevent WMD from getting into the wrong hands; albeit, the likelihood exists that some BCW or technology will find its way into the hands of a rogue state or developing country. Determining the intent of this production therefore becomes essential and will require significant intelligence activities.
Similarly, biological weapon production offers the same attractiveness. All biological production equipment is dual-use. That is to say that the equipment required to produce legitimate biological agents, such as vaccines, can be used to produce biological agents for military purposes. As with chemical agent production, determining one's production intent is critical.
In addition to effectively concealing biological and chemical agent production, adversaries find BCW attractive due to the lethality these weapons can induce for relatively little economic cost. Chemical weapons can quickly produce a significant number of casualties in and around the point of detonation or dispersal. Biological weapons also produce numerous casualties; however, they have lethal effects over much larger areas based on the biological agent spreading from one infected individual to another. At the strategic level, BCW are enticing because of their deterrent qualities. An adversary can threaten the use of these weapons in an attempt to deter the United States from entering into a war. Modern history has shown that the American public and politicians will not tolerate significant casualties in a war. The threat of mass casualties, therefore, can provide a strong deterrent. One could argue that BCW are not a credible deterrent because of the U.S.
military's victory in the Persian Gulf War, even with the looming threat of biological or chemical warfare. Nevertheless, adversaries could threaten coalition partners with BCW in an effort to £ause a rift in the coalition. With few exceptions, the United States is technologically advancing at a much faster rate than any other military in the world. These advances may conflict with the probability that future contingencies may often involve coalitions. 13 If potential coalition partners do not keep pace with the United States in biological and chemical defense, the enemy can exploit this exposed vulnerability and potentially discourage the coalition from entering into a conflict.
As long as countries, rogue states, or terrorists find BCW programs attractive, they will continue to find ways of acquiring or maintaining them. The U.S. military must focus on nullifying this attraction.
U.S. Military Role in Countering Biological and Chemical Warfare
U.S. military actions, combined with interagency and coalition efforts, must concentrate on attacking the adversary's will to possess or employ BCW. This is the only long-lasting solution for eliminating the threat that currently haunts the world. The U.S. military can deter further BCW aggression through force protection measures, robust intelligence, trained and confident forces, preemptive capabilities, and consequence management activities. These deterrent means cannot be mutually exclusive. The campaign against BCW must include all of these factors, for if one is missing, an adversary may still be able to retain some strategic or military leverage and will continue to find a BCW program inviting. When addressing deterrence, it is credible only when it meets three requirements: the United States must be able to respond effectively; the adversary must believe that the United States intends to respond;
and the United States must be able to defend itself and forces against a biological or chemical attack.
14

Force Protection
Force Protection, along with protection of key facilities and terrain, are critical links in defeating the enemy's center of gravity through the elimination of its perceived value of employing BCW. It must be planned for in great detail at both the tactical and operational levels of war. If the U.S. military can adequately protect its forces, key facilities, and key terrain, the BCW effects that an adversary desires will not come to fruition. The CINCs are aware of this fact and are pursuing this criticality. Their number one priority in the counterproliferation arena is to acquire improved equipment to detect and characterize BCW threats, particularly at long ranges.
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Currently, our military is equipped with limited detection and early warning equipment. In particular, biological agent detectors used in the Persian Gulf War were built and tested in 1972. 16 What the U.S. military needs is lightweight, universal, and automatic detectors that can provide adequate early warning, detect and characterize biological and chemical agents,
and provide a reliable "all clear" indicator. 17 Adequate early warning systems, in particular, are imperative to allow commanders adequate time to protect forces, key facilities, and terrain. The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized this detection deficiency and is working on a biological agent detection system designed to detect and characterize agents specifically at air bases and port facilities which are critical for preconflict buildup, sustainment operations, and force projection. This system is to be fielded for testing in fiscal year 1998. 18 While the potential of these sensors is promising, one must take into account that our adversaries will most assuredly be pursuing countermeasures to these developments to include biological manipulation designed to fool detectors. 19 The CINCs' second priority is to control the ability to intercept cruise missiles capable of delivering deadly biological and chemical agents. Emphasis is and must continue to be placed on ballistic missile defense-particularly since they are proliferating at an astonishing rate.
Active ballistic defense encompasses the effective interception and destruction of missiles in the act of delivery. 21 Based on the large doses of biological or chemical agents that can be released from a sizable warhead placed on a ballistic missile, U.S. forces must develop a reliable and effective boost phase intercept capability. This would result in contamination of the adversary's territory vice friendly territory. Consequences otherwise are completely unacceptable. Had the U.S. military not been able to destroy Scuds launched at Israel during the Persian Gulf War, Israel would have, in all probability, entered the war and fractured the coalition.
Efficient decontamination capabilities are another critical link in force protection. Without it, an adversary can severely hamper U.S. military and coalition forces' freedom of maneuver and agility on the battlefield. Currently, however, decontamination capabilities of the U.S.
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military are archaic and present a significant burden to logistics functions.
The requirement to develop rapid and effective decontamination processes for equipment and terrain at port facilities, air bases, supply points, and points of significant troop concentration is crucial. Failure to do so will significantly affect our warfighting strategy of mobility. In addition to facilities and key terrain, efforts must also focus on rapidly and effectively decontaminating and treating contaminated casualties, as well as procedures for safely disposing of biologically or chemically contaminated dead. 23 Particularly in reference to a biological attack, an adversary wants to inflict significant casualties through individual-toindividual contamination. If the U.S. military cannot adequately perform decontamination, the enemy will maintain military leverage and will continue to find advantages in having a BCW program.
A final link in BCW force protection is the absolute requirement for individual protection.
Today, our military's individual BCW protective systems are burdensome and cause serious degradation of normal battlefield functions. This provides the adversary a marked advantage on the modern battlefield. Improvements to the existing protective systems or technological developments must occur to ensure the safety of our troops. Lightweight protective gear that is not cumbersome is quintessential for our soldiers to maintain the warfighting skills they currently possess in a non-biologically or chemically contaminated environment. These systems must permit normal functioning in a myriad of climates, ensuring that hot or cold weather related casualties do not occur and limit the forces available for mission accomplishment.
Biological vaccines are being developed and refined by DoD in an effort to nullify the effects of biological agents. The problem exists; nevertheless, that U.S. forces remain vulnerable to biological effects because DoD has yet to adequately address many shortcomings identified during the Persian Gulf War. One of these shortcomings is the critical shortage of vaccine stocks. 25 Although vaccines appear to part of the solution, one percent of a population that receives them does not build up sufficient immunity. 26 The development of vaccines, therefore, requires substantial improvements in order to be effective. In light of recent advances in biotechnology, it is not likely that an adversary can develop a biological agent for which only he or she possesses the antidote?
In addition to U.S. military protection, the presence of civilians in a theater of war continues to emerge as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. Critical for victory, CINCs must ensure that these civilians are equipped with and trained on individual protective equipment. Additionally, CINCs must protect family members assigned to theaters in which there exists a biological or chemical threat.
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BCW force protection, to include civilians participating in military operations, is paramount not only in reducing battlefield casualties but in ensuring that our forces are trained and confident to operate in these adverse environments. Without it, an adversary is likely to continue pursuing a BCW capability.
Trained and Confident Forces
U.S. forces must be prepared to conduct operations in a biological or chemical environment with minimal degradation. 28 The adage "train as you fight" certainly applies with respect to conducting such operations. Our forces must be trained and confident to perform the offensive and defensive skills necessary for victory in a contaminated environment.
Confidence will assist in eliminating current fears associated with BCW. Fear, a perceived causal effect of BCW, inhibits combat operations and provides an adversary with a distinct psychological advantage that produces military leverage. To make an analogy, prior to the Vietnam War, the U.S. military rarely conducted operations at night because of inadequate night vision capability and training. Today, however, our forces often prefer to operate at night and are extremely confident in their ability to do so because that is how they train. The same thing must hold true with fighting in a biological or chemical environment. Potential coalition forces and allies must become proficient as well. Failure to do so could result in an exposed vulnerability, since future contingencies involving the U.S. military will likely involve coalition participation. As important as the training and confidence of our forces are, it is equally important that our potential adversaries believe that our military can operate in such an environment and can do so decisively with little to no degradation. This will aid in depreciating the attractiveness of possessing BCW. Today, the intelligence community is faced with three BCW identification challenges: dualuse technologies; deep underground facilities; and the proper identification of threat warheads.
These challenges must be overcome or our military will be unable to completely attack the adversary's center of gravity.
As previously noted, biological and chemical agent production for military purposes is difficult to identify because of dual-use technologies. Since there are similarities with legitimate and illegitimate biological and chemical agent production, human intelligence may be the only near term solution to identify the intent of this production. Research, nevertheless, should continue to develop technologies to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate processing because human intelligence is inherently time intensive and presents a great risk to collection assets.
In addition to the dilemma posed by dual-use technologies, deep underground facilities are equally troubling. Placing biological or chemical storage or production facilities deep underground masks their activities and increases survivability in case of attack. 33 These types of facilities appear to be a growing trend as demonstrated by Libya's attempt to construct an underground chemical facility at Tarhunah. 34 The intelligence community must continue to locate and identify these facilities to support their destruction through diplomatic or military means.
A third intelligence challenge relates to one of the CINCs' counterproliferation priorities previously addressed: intercepting cruise missiles. What complicates identifying and destroying threat missiles are the biological or chemical warheads that can be attached to them. The intelligence community must be able to properly identify the type of warhead on a missile in order for the commander to know how to best destroy it while minimizing or negating collateral effects.
The intelligence community must conquer all of these significant challenges. To do this it will have to effectively identify intangibles such as the will of an adversary as well as tangibles including deep underground facilities. Human intelligence, combined with advances in intelligence collection technology, are the keys to success. Without them, our diplomats and military will not be afforded the opportunity to eliminate BCW.
Preemptive Capabilities
One of the most controversial means that the U.S. military can eliminate BCW and attack the enemies' center of gravity is by preemptive strikes. The basic premise of preemption is to attack an adversary armed with BCW before it has the opportunity to employ them against U.S. or coalition militaries. The issue of attacking another nation's sovereignty during peacetime; however, is an ongoing debate within the international legal community.
Article 51 Command has a principal mission to train and provide forces capable of BCW defeat. Based on the complexity and level of training required to master the skills necessary to perform such operations, it is best to have an extremely qualified force within the Special Operations community rather than numerous "somewhat" qualified forces throughout the Services. The ramifications of an unsuccessful preemptive attack will most assuredly have grave consequences.
In the event that a BCW or critical node can be targeted and destroyed via conventional means, it is imperative that the U.S. military possess the weapons necessary to accomplish it with little or no collateral damage. Today, munitions must not merely penetrate great distances below the earth's surface but must be able to destroy the target with high confidence. BCW facilities on land present equally challenging targets. As seen during the Persian Gulf War, BCW sites and critical nodes were often placed in large built-up areas.
Sadam Hussein purposefully placed them there in an effort to deter the U.S. military strikes.
Massive noncombatant casualties are unacceptable to our military and the American public.
Technology, therefore, must continue to focus on precision munitions that will destroy the target while negating the effects of biological and chemical agent release.
Consequence Management
In the event that the U.S. military roles already discussed in this paper fail, and an adversary successfully employs BCW, CINCs must retain a well-planned and rehearsed consequence management plan. As with force protection, if the U.S. military can nullify the desired effects of biological or chemical warfare it will directly attack the enemy's will to obtain or employ such a capability.
CINCs have access to DoD assets that can assist in mitigating the effects of discharged biological or chemical agents. Although somewhat limited, the U.S. military is better equipped than any military in the world. Within a given theater, the CINC must coordinate with both the American embassy and host nation officials to contain the attack and reduce the number of casualties to the greatest extent possible. Principal tasks will include among others:
reinforcing host nation medical capabilities; casualty evacuation; providing prophylaxis; public affairs; psychological operations; biological or chemical agent detection and identification; and decontamination.
Consequence management must be well planned and integrated into joint and combined training exercises and wargames. Although limited in numbers, specific biological and chemical response units from all of the Services must actively participate. This planning, along with lessons learned, will assist the geographic combatant commander in properly allocating key units and equipment to host nations requiring military consequence management assistance.
Conclusion
The threat of biological and chemical warfare is global in nature and is one of the greatest challenges the U.S. military faces in the post-Cold War Era. BCW have become the most accessible WMD to industrialized and developing countries. Our military can and must play a critical role in its defeat. Every counterproliferation activity must focus on attacking the enemy's center of gravity -its will to possess or employ these ghastly WMD. Taking away the perceived attractiveness of BCW is the singular, long-term solution to a global crisis.
Our forces must perform a myriad of tasks in support this effort which are: training our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to fight and win in a biological or chemical contaminated environment; protecting key facilities and terrain from BCW effects; locating BCW and related facilities; possessing the capability to destroy these facilities preemptively or post-launch; and maintaining a well planned and rehearsed consequence management plan.
These critical tasks are not mutually exclusive. They all must be accomplished to effectively attack the adversary's center of gravity. Failure to accomplish even one of these tasks will continue to make BCW programs enticing based on the perceived political or military leverage an adversary desires.
Advanced technology combined with individual and unit training are quintessential in accomplishing these tasks. Our military is the most technologically advanced and best trained in the world, but it has to quickly move forward in this venue. Caution; nevertheless, must be exercised so that our military capabilities do not significantly exceed those of potential coalition militaries. If they do, an adversary may be able to exploit this critical vulnerability and still fifod BCW attractive. 
